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CASE COMMENTS
JUVENILE COURTS -

WAIVER OF JUVENILE

JURISDICTION AFTER ADJUDICATION OF
DELINQUENCY VIOLATES DOUBLE
JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF FIFTH AMENDMENT
Protection against double jeopardy in criminal proceedings is
guaranteed to all persons by the fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United States.' Although originally construed by the
United States Supreme Court to be inapplicable to the states, 2 in
1969 the Court reversed itself, holding that the due process clause
was binding on the states through the fourteenth amendment on
the ground that the double jeopardy prohibition was a fundamen3
tal ideal of the Constitution.
The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy is
based on the principle that the state should not be permitted to
invoke all its resources and power in repeated attempts to convict
an individual for an alleged offense. A person must not twice be
I "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The Constitution of West Virginia
also provides no person shall "in any criminal case ... be twice put in jeopardy of
life or liberty for the same offence." W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 5. For a general
background of double jeopardy, see J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY (1969).
2 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). Under a state statute allowing
appeal by the state in a criminal proceeding, Palko's conviction of second degree
murder was appealed and reversed. His case was remanded; Palko was found guilty
of first degree murder and sentenced to death. In holding that the double jeopardy
prohibition of the Constitution of the United States did not apply to the states
through the fourteenth amendment, the United States Supreme Court asked, "Is
that kind of double jeopardy to which the statute has subjected him a hardship so
acute and shocking that our policy will not endure it?" Id. at 328. A negative answer
was given, differentiating the prohibition of double jeopardy from those rights, such
as freedom of speech, applied to the states because they are "found to be implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. at 325.
3 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Petitioner had been indicted for
both larceny and burglary but had been convicted only of burglary. His trial had
been held under an invalid constitutional provision, so petitioner was given the
option of reindictment and retrial. He chose to be reindicted and retried and the
second time was convicted of both larceny and burglary. The United States Supreme Court agreed the larceny conviction violated the double jeopardy prohibition
in the Constitution of the United States. The Court further held the protection
should apply to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
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subjected to "embarrassment, expense and ordeal" and be compelled to "live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity." 4
The double jeopardy concept has proven to be an important and
often contested aspect of American criminal proceedings. 5 One
controversial consideration lies in defining that point in the trial
at which jeopardy attaches. The question arises because jeopardy
relates to a "potential" of conviction; a final judgment is not required.6 Consequently, if the trial is stopped or disposed of by other
than a final judgment, whether jeopardy has yet attached becomes
a critical consideration. 7 The West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals has held that an individual is in jeopardy when he "has
been placed on trial on a valid indictment, before a court of competent jurisdiction, has been arraigned, has pleaded, and a jury has
been impaneled and sworn." 8 West Virginia is in accord with the
general rule set out by the United States Supreme Court in Kepner
v. United States?
Both the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of West Virginia specify that no "person" shall be subjected
to double jeopardy. 0 However, until the recent landmark decision
of Breed v. Jones," double jeopardy protection was denied to
youths close to the maximum age limit for juvenile court jurisdiction, who were tried first in the juvenile court and then again as
adults.' 2 The juveniles were subjected to trial in both the juvenile
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).

E.g., United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964);
Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970); illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973);
State v. Taylor, 130 W. Va. 74, 42 S.E.2d 549 (1947); State v. Holland, 149 W. Va.
731, 143 S.E.2d 148 (1965); State v. Carroll, 150 W. Va. 765, 149 S.E.2d 309 (1966).
Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326 (1970).
For a more in-depth view of the questions surrounding attachment of jeopardy, see Sigler, FederalDouble Jeopardy Policy, 19 VAND. L. REv. 375, 376-82
(1966).
O Brooks v. Boles, 151 W. Va. 576, 583, 153 S.E.2d 526, 530 (1967).
O 195 U.S. 100, 128 (1904). In Kepner, the Court, referring to a trial without a
jury, stated jeopardy attaches when the individual is "regularly charged with a
crime before a tribunal properly organized and competent to try him." Id. This is
important, because the United States Supreme Court has held a jury is not constitutionally required in a juvenile trial. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528
(1971). West Virginia, however, has statutorily given juveniles the right to demand
a jury trial. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-6 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
10 U.S. CONST. amend. V; W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 5. See note 1 supra.
95 S. Ct. 1779 (1975).
,2 E.g., Seagroves v. State, 279 Ala. 621, 189 So. 2d 137 (1966); State v. R.E.F.,
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and the criminal courts because of a waiver procedure adopted by
many jurisdictions,' 3 which enables the juvenile judge to waive
jurisdiction after adjudicating the defendant to be delinquent,
transfering the youth to the criminal court. This waiver procedure
has been a questioned, but generally accepted, practice in the
juvenile justice system. 4
The American juvenile court system, conceived in idealism,
has become a complexity of frustration and change. The juvenile
court originated with the goal of rehabilitating, rather than punishing, wayward youths.' 5 The theoretical concept had developed
from the chancery courts of fifteenth century England, which were
created by the king, "the father of his country," to protect those
children who today would be considered "neglected" or "dependent."'" The chancery court dealt with questions of property and
financial support, rather than with criminal activity. The attitude
of parens patraie,'7 was incorporated into the criminal juvenile
proceedings of the United States in the nineteenth century. A separate juvenile court system was formed to consider the welfare of
the child as opposed to issues of innocence or guilt. The court was
to understand and analyze the problems of the child and to provide
treatment that would restore him to a constructive role in society."'
251 So. 2d 672 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1971), aff'd 265 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1972); Lewis v.
Commonwealth, 214 Va. 150, 198 S.E.2d 629 (1973); State ex rel. Slatton v. Boles,
147 W. Va. 674, 130 S.E.2d 192 (1963); Brooks v. Boles, 151 W. Va. 576, 153 S.E.2d
526 (1967).
"1 In 1972, 44 jurisdictions had some sort of waiver provision in their juvenile
court statutes. Rudstein, Double Jeopardyin Juvenile Proceedings,14 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 266, 297-300 (1972).
11Regarding the accepted practice, see Stamn, Transfer of Jurisdictionin Juvenile Court: An Analysis of the Proceeding, Its Role in the Administration of
Justice, and a Proposal for the Reform of Kentucky Law, 62 Ky. L.J. 122 (1973).
For articles questioning the practice, see Comment, Juvenile Court: Due Process,
Double Jeopardy,and the Florida Waiver Procedures,26 U. FLA. L. REV. 300 (1974);
Rudstein, Double Jeopardy in Juvenile Proceedings, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 266
(1972).
Is For an insight into the origins of the juvenile court system, see S. BARROWS,
CHILDREN'S COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES,

H.R. Doc. No. 701, 58th Cong., 2d Sess.

(Reprint 1973, Comm. Print 1904).
11M. HASKELL & L. YABLONSKY, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 226 (1970). For the
legal definition of a "neglected" child in West Virginia, see W. VA. CODE ANN. §
49-1-3 (1966).
' Pareas patraie is the Latin term denoting that the king, as "father of his
country," was the protector of orphaned and neglected children.
'" M. HASKELL & L. YABLONSKY, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 225-28 (1970). See

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1976

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 3 [1976], Art. 9
CASE COMMENTS
The juvenile proceedings were to be flexible and informal; in order
to obtain such qualities, most criminal trial procedures were discarded. In exchange for this fatherly, sympathetic court, youths
relinquished many of their constitutional rights.'9
Experience has proven the idealistic juvenile justice system
somewhat of a failure. The juveniles often are not easily reformed
first offenders, and the judges are not the psychologists once envisioned. Communities cannot or will not furnish the time, finances,
and interest needed to render the juvenile system a success." Society has realized that all juvenile delinquents are not harmless
children and that some pose actual threats to public security. In
order to protect its superior interest in public security, society has
been forced to recognize the shortcomings of the purely paternalistic approach to delinquency cases. To meet the deficiencies of the
juvenile justice system, revisions have been and must continue to
be made."
With realism has come a demand for constitutional guarantees in juvenile proceedings. In Kent v. United States,2 the United
States Supreme Court recognized, "[t]he admonition to function
in a 'parental relationship' is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness." One of the most notable progressions came in the 1967
decision of In re Gault.2 4 The Court incorporated five basic rights
into juvenile proceedings: 1) the right to adequate notice of the
27
2
charge,2 2) the right to counsel, 3) the right to confrontation,
4) the right to protection against self-incrimination, and 5) the
also, Note, Juvenile Courts: Kentucky Law in Need of Revision, 59 Ky. L.J. 719

(1971).
"1 See Note, Juvenile Courts: Kentucky Law in Need of Revision, 59 Ky. L.J.
719, 724 (1971), where the exchange is characterized as a fictional contract.
20 See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SociETY

55-89 (United States Gov't

Printing Office ed. 1967). For example, few communities have established the
Youth Services Bureaus recommended by the President's Commission. Id. at 83,
proposing the recommendation.
21Id.
22 383

U.S. 541 (1966).

" Id. at 555.
2,387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2 Id. at 33.
28

Id. at 36.

" Id. at 56.
21 Id. at 55.
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right to cross-examination.29 The Court pointed out that "neither
the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone."3 In 1970, the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt was added. 3 ' Though recognition of these constitutional
guarantees in juvenile proceedings has eroded the doctrine of
parens patraie,the concept has not been totally rejected. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,3 the Court emphasized it had not yet held
that all constitutional guarantees assured in an adult criminal
proceeding are enforceable in a juvenile trial.3 3 Balancing the fundamentality of the right with the right's effect on the flexibility
and informality of juvenile proceedings, the Court denied youths
the constitutional right to a trial by jury in juvenile proceedings. 4
Since the trend had been toward incorporating constitutional
rights into the juvenile court system, the decision of McKeiver
caused some comment.3 The case, easily misinterpreted or misapplied, has been viewed as an abrupt halt to the expansion of juvenile rights by the Court.3 1 One major concern of critics favoring
further expansion was the fact that the Court had not yet spoken
to the issue of double jeopardy with regard to the waiver procedure .3
In the California case of Breed v. Jones,31 the United States
Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, once again extended the
realm of constitutional guarantees in juvenile proceedings. The
Court held Jones' criminal trial, which followed waiver of juvenile
violated
court jurisdiction after an adjudication of delinquency,
3
the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. 1
In the Breed case seventeen-year old Gary Steven Jones was
brought before the juvenile court on a petition alleging he had
committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute
a felony.40 A jurisdictional hearing was initially held, determining
29

Id. at 57.

1* Id. at 13.

3,In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
32 403 U.S. 528 (1971).

Id. at 533.
31Id. at 545.
3

38

See 8 U. RICH. L. REv. 601 (1974); 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 702, 708-09.
See 8 U. RICH. L. REv. 601 (1974).

37See Note, Juvenile Court: Due Process, Double Jeopardy, and the Florida
Waiver Procedures, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 300 (1974).
- 95 S. Ct. 1779 (1975).
39 Id.
11 The act committed by Jones would have constituted robbery under the
California Penal Code. PEN. C.A. § 211 (1971).
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that Jones was a minor described by the juvenile court statute .4
The allegations of delinquency were found to be true, and the
proceedings were continued for a dispositional hearing." The juvenile court found Jones "unfit for treatment as a juvenile";43 he was
then prosecuted as an adult and convicted.
Contending that he had been subjected to double jeopardy by
the procedure, Jones sought a writ of habeas corpus. The United
States district court rejected Jones' petition for the writ. 4 The
court of appeals reversed the district court, finding double jeopardy "fully applicable to juvenile court proceedings." 5 The United
States Supreme Court held that Jones' trial as an adult, following
a waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction after an adjudication on the
merits, violated Jones' right to protection against double jeopardy.4" The Court directed the writ of habeas corpus to be issued,
vacated the criminal conviction, and ordered that Jones either be
set free or be remanded to the juvenile court.47
In reaching its decision, the Court dealt with several important issues. The Court stressed that jeopardy refers to "risk" and
not to punishment. 8 Although "risk" has traditionally been regarded as the risk of proceedings which may end with criminal
punishment, the term is equally applicable to the processes of a
juvenile hearing, since both proceedings subject the accused to
11W. & I.C.A.

§ 602 (Supp. 1975):

Any person who is under the age of 18 years when he violates any law of
this state or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or county
of this state defining crime ... is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court.
11At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court announced its intention to
find Jones "not. . . amenable to the care, treatment and training program available through the facilities of the juvenile court." 95 S. Ct. at 1782, quoting the
language of the juvenile court. Jones' attorney moved "to continue the matter on
the ground of surprise," contending Jones had not been informed "it was going to
be a fitness hearing." Id. at 1783, quoting the language of Jones' attorney before
the juvenile court. The matter was continued for one week. Then, having considered
the report and having heard the testimony of Jones' probation officer, the juvenile
court found the youth "unfit for treatment as a juvenile" and ordered that he be
prosecuted as an adult. Id., quoting the language of the juvenile court.
Id. at 1783, quoting the language of the juvenile court.
" Jones v. Breed, 343 F. Supp. 690 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
45497 F.2d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 1974).
4' 95 S. Ct. 1779 (1975).

4 Id. at 1791.
'

Id. at 1785.
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heavy pressures and to the possibilities of grave sanctions."5 Thus,
as in a criminal court, jeopardy attaches when the juvenile court,
as the "trier of facts," begins to hear evidence."
Having found that jeopardy attaches at the juvenile stage, the
Court then dealt with the question of whether subsequent criminal
trials subject youths to double jeopardy.' The State contended
that the jeopardy which attaches at the adjudicatory hearing "continues" until the adult conviction. This concept of "continuing
jeopardy," first expounded by Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissent
in Kepner v. United States,52 has never been adopted by a majority
of the Court. 3 Though continuing jeopardy has been used to explain why an accused whose conviction was reversed on appeal
may be retried for the same offense, the Court stated that "a more
satisfactory explanation [for allowing the second trial] lies in
analysis of the respective interests involved."54 Similarly, continuing jeopardy was not a sound explanation for subjecting a youth
to two trials. If the Court were to refuse recognition of double
jeopardy in juvenile proceedings, a more satisfactory reason than
continuing jeopardy was required. Consequently, the Court based
its decision on an analysis of the "respective interests involved."5
The Court found Jones to have been placed in double jeopardy,
even though the proceedings against Jones had not "run their full
course,"5 on the grounds that his criminal trial was a second trial
for the same offense, against which there is constitutional protec57
tion.
Thus, the Court found that juveniles are subjected to double
jeopardy by a criminal trial subsequent to an adjudication of delinquency. The Court then determined whether or not the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy should be enforced in juvenile proceedings. In making this determination, the
Court applied the balancing test set forth in McKeiver, balancing
4'Id. at 1786.
5oId. at 1787.
" Id. at 1788.
52 195 U.S. at 134-37.

United States v. Jenkins, 95 S. Ct. 1006, 1013 (1975).
4 95 S. Ct. at 1788.
IId.
Id., quoting from Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326 (1970).

'3

'T

95 S. Ct. at 1788.
Id. at 1788-91.
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the fundamentality of the right to protection against double jeopardy with the right's effect on the flexibility and informality of the
juvenile proceedings. 9 The Court acknowledged that transfer of
jurisdiction is an important aspect of the juvenile court's flexibility
and is a viable alternative for those youths who cannot profit from
the guidance and treatment of the juvenile system."0 However, the
Court also stated that granting protection against double jeopardy
would not significantly hamper the informality and other benefits
derived from the waiver procedure. 1 The effective use of waiver
has not been hindered in the large number of jurisdictions 2 which
3
presently require transfer before any adjudication of delinquency.
Further, the objectives of the juvenile system should be aided by
the granting of the right against double jeopardy, since the juvenile
and his attorney, rather than being concerned with tactics and the
risk of transfer, can concentrate on establishing innocence or seeking the most suitable disposition for the youth. 4
As a result of the Breed decision, the United States Supreme
Court requires that
a State determine whether it wants to treat a juvenile within
the juvenile court system before entering upon a proceeding
that may result in an adjudication that he has violated a criminal law and in a substantial deprivation of liberty, rather than
subject him to the expense, delay, strain, and embarrassment
of two such proceedings. 5
The Breed decision will have a profound effect upon juvenile
proceedings in West Virginia. In Breed, the Court emphasized that
adjudicating juvenile delinquency is equal in gravity to a criminal
trial 6 because it imposes psychological, physical, and financial
5' Id. at 1789.
60 95 S. Ct. at 1788.
S,

Id. at 1789.

62

See Rudstein, Double Jeopardy in Juvenile Proceedings,14 WM. & MARY L.

REv. 266, 297-300 (1972).
1195 S. Ct. at 1790. One method of preventing envisioned burdens is through
the use of two judges, one presiding over the waiver hearing and another over the
adjudication of delinquency. This alleviates the problem of prejudice in the second
proceeding. Such a bifurcated proceeding was recommended by the President's
Commission with regard to the adjudication of delinquency and the disposition of
the case. THE

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SociErY 232-33 (1968).

e 95 S. Ct. at 1791.
65

Id. at 1790.

6e Id. at 1786.
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burdens equal to those in an adult proceeding. 7 The Court did not
go so far as to declare juvenile hearings are criminal proceedings
per se, but merely held that there is no persuasive distinction
between the two on the aspect of risk which invokes jeopardy."
West Virginia has never recognized any relationship between
criminal and juvenile proceedings with regard to jeopardy. The
settled rule in West Virginia has been that the trial of a juvenile
for delinquency is definitely not a criminal trial, but rather a proceeding designed to relieve the youth of a criminal trial. 9
In the important case of Brooks v. Boles,7" the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals, basing its decision on the non-criminal
character of a juvenile trial, refused a contention of double jeop;
ardy. In Brooks, the youth was not only adjudged delinquent, but
had also been committed to the industrial school.7' Upon his return
to the juvenile court for misbehaving at the school, the youth was
transferred to the criminal court and retried for the original offense. 7 His trial and conviction as an adult were deemed not to
violate his fifth amendment protection on the ground that jeopardy had not attached in the first proceeding or even upon the final
adjudication of delinquency and disposition of the case.73 In Breed,
not only did the United States Supreme Court declare juveniles
have constitutional protection against double jeopardy, but also
that jeopardy attaches when the juvenile court, as the trier of
fact,begins to hear evidence.74 Thus, West Virginia must now give
recognition to the attachment of jeopardy in juvenile proceedings.
The "'civil' label of convenience"75 which has characterized the
juvenile court system must no longer be used to deny youths their
constitutional guarantees.76
" See Snyder, The Impact of the Juvenile Court Hearing on the Child, 17
& DELINQUENCY 180 (1971).
1195 S. Ct. at 1786.
do E.g., State v. Skeen, 138 W. Va. 116, 75 S.E.2d 223 (1953); State ex rel.
Slatton v. Boles, 147 W. Va. 674, 130 S.E.2d 192; Brooks v. Boles, 151 W. Va. 576,
153 S.E.2d 526 (1967).
70 151 W. Va. 576, 153 S.E.2d 526 (1967).
7' Id. at 578, 153 S.E.2d at 528.
72 Id.
Id. at 582-84, 153 S.E.2d at 530-31.
7 95 S. Ct. at 1787.
7 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967).
' 95 S. Ct. at 1785.
CRIME
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Ultimately, in light of the Breed decision, a portion of the
West Virginia juvenile judicial code is unconstitutional. As one
method of disposition in a juvenile proceeding in West Virginia,
the juvenile judge may, "after the proceedings," waive jurisdiction.7" Other statutory methods of disposition include commitment
of the child to an industrial home or placing him under the supervision of a probation officer. 8 The "proceedings," therefore, must
refer to the adjudication of delinquency. Though not always complied with in practice,79 West Virginia requires that a youth be
adjudged delinquent before he may be transferred to the adult
court.80
West Virginia was cited in the footnotes of the Breed decision
as one of "two jurisdictions [which] appear presently to require a
finding of delinquency before the transfer of a juvenile to adult
court."'" The other state listed was Alabama;82 thus, the Alabama
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-11 (Cum. Supp. 1975):
With a view to the welfare and interest of the child and of the State, the
court or judge may, after the proceedings, make any of the following
dispositions:

"

(3) If the child be over sixteen years of age at the time of the commission
of the offense the court may, if the proceedings originated as a criminal
proceeding, enter an order showing its refusal to take jurisdiction as a
juvenile proceeding and permit the child to be proceeded against in accordance with the laws of the State governing the commission of crimes
or violation of municipal ordinances.
"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-11 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
' For example, see Crow v. Coiner, 323 F. Supp. 555 (N.D.W. Va. 1971). In
Crow, the youth escaped from forestry camp and stole a truck. The juvenile court,
upon determining Crow lacked funds to employ counsel and was over sixteen years
old, appointed counsel, refused to accept jurisdiction, and transferred the case to
the criminal court for further proceedings. Crow was indicted for grand larceny and
referred back to the juvenile court, which again refused jurisdiction. Id. at 557. In
the subsequent habeas corpus action, the federal district court found it apparent
that the juvenile court's handling of the case complied with West Virginia law. Id.
at 558. No discussion, however, was given the "after the proceedings" phrase in the
West Virginia waiver statute. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-14 (1966), as amended W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-11 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
11W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-11 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
"9 95 S. Ct. at 1789, n.16. The section to which the opinion referred was W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 49-5-14 (1966). In 1975 the juvenile code was revised, and the section
on dispositions was renumbered W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-11 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
As will be discussed later in this comment, the alterations have no effect on the
impact of Breed in West Virginia.
92 ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 364 (1958):
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experience should be probative in interpreting West Virginia's
statute.
The Supreme Court of Alabama has found transfer to be a two
step consideration.8 3 Initially, the court determines whether the
child is delinquent, an action similar to the "proceedings" under
the West Virginia statute. 4 Then, after "thorough investigation or
exercise of its disciplinary measures," the juvenile court decides
whether or not the child can be reformed. As in West Virginia,"6 if
the court determines the youth will not benefit from treatment
within the juvenile system,the judge waives jurisdiction and transfers the child to the criminal court. 7 Thus, although no West Virginia case can be found on point, the West Virginia statute, like
the Alabama procedure, must be construed as requiring the waiver
hearing to follow the adjudication of delinquency.
The 1975 revision of West Virginia's juvenile code has altered
the waiver provision in form but not in substance. The thrust of
the change was to delete any reference to a "juvenile court"; 8 this
was necessary to make the article conform with the 1974 Judicial
Reorganization Amendment.8 ' The new judicial amendment vests
non-appellate judicial power in only the circuit courts and the
magistrate courts. This restriction would have invalidated the juvenile jurisdiction previously granted to inferior tribunals.8 Thus,
If, at any time, after thorough investigation or exercise of its disciplinary

measures, the juvenile court or judge thereof shall be convinced that a
delinquent child, more than fourteen years of age, brought before it under
the terms of this chapter cannot be made to lead a correct life and cannot
be properly disciplined under the provisions of this chapter, the juvenile
court or judge thereof shall have authority to transfer the care of such
delinquent to the jurisdiction of any other court in the county having
jurisdiction of the offense with which said child is charged, there to be
proceeded against according to law.
Seagroves v. State, 279 Ala. 621, 189 So. 2d 137 (1966).
"

'5
"
'7

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-11 (Cum. Supp. 1975).

ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 364 (1958).
See Brooks v. Boles, 151 W. Va. 576, 153 S.E.2d 526 (1967).
ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 364 (1958).

" The Judicial Reorganization Amendment was the reason for the revision of
the juvenile court statutes given by Legislative Services of the West Virginia Legislature in a letter dated September 30, 1975.
"' W. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 1. "The judicial power of the state shall be vested
solely in a supreme court of appeals and in the circuit courts, and in such intermediate appellate courts and magistrate courts as shall be hereinafter established by the

legislature, and in the justices, judges and magistrates of such courts."
"0 W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-1 (1966):
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original jurisdiction for juvenile proceedings now lies only in the
circuit court of the county.'
The Reorganization Amendment prompted the elimination of
the language in the old juvenile disposition statute referring to a
"court other than a juvenile court"9" and providing for transfer to
the "court of origin, or to any court in the county having juvenile
jurisdiction." 3 The circuit court is now the sole court with jurisdiction over juveniles and, with the exception of the magistrate court,
over criminal proceedings.
The Judicial Reorganization Amendment did not eliminate
the juvenile justice system; its effect was to make juvenile proceedings one function of the circuit court. Thus, waiver is no longer the
transfer of a youth from the juvenile court to a criminal court, but
is simply the circuit court's refusal to take jurisdiction as a juvenile
proceeding. The refusal cannot take place until "after the proceedings" which determine whether or not the youth is a delinquent. 4
The subsequent criminal proceedings held by the circuit court constitute double jeopardy, as would trial in a criminal court after
actual transfer from a separate juvenile court, where the case was
heard on its merits. Therefore, the revision of West Virginia's juvenile judicial code has no effect on the impact of the Breed decision
upon the state's proceeding.
The procedures followed by the juvenile court in California
and giving rise to the dispute in Breed, though not statutorily
The circuit court of the county shall have original jurisdiction in proceedings brought by petition under this article. If, however, a court of record
in addition to the circuit court has been or is subsequently created in a
county, proceedings under this article shall be held in the additional
court with right of appeal to the circuit court as follows:
(1) The domestic relations court, or if there is none,
(2) The court of common pleas or intermediate court having chancery jurisdiction, or if there is none,
(3) The criminal court.
Such a grant was in accord with W. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 1 (1880). "The judicial
power of the State shall be vested in a supreme court of appeals, in circuit courts
and the judges thereof, in such inferior tribunals as are herein authorized and in
justices of the peace."
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-1 (Cum. Supp. 1975). "The circuit court of the
county shall have original jurisdiction in proceedings brought by petition under this
article."
,1 W. VA. CODE ANN.

§ 49-5-14(3)

93 Id.
" W. VA. CODE ANN.

§

(1966).

49-5-11 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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required, were similar to those used in West Virginia." After the
allegations of delinquency were found to be true, the court, having
found Jones "unfit for treatment as a juvenile," transferred him
to an adult court. 6 Therefore, in light of the Breed decision, the
juvenile waiver statute of West Virginia, when challenged, must be
declared unconstitutional, violative of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
The West Virginia Legislature must once again revise the
state's juvenile judicial code. The Uniform Juvenile Court Act and
other model codes should be examined and the Breed decision
followed in making the revision. The option of waiver to a criminal
trial must be removed from the post-adjudication methods of disposition available to the court. A statute must be drafted providing
that the decision to waive jurisdiction, if at all, must be made
before the allegation of delinquency is heard on its merits." The
changes must be made if West Virginia is to afford every person
his constitutional right to protection against double jeopardy.
Taunja Willis Miller
15Id.
95 S. Ct. 1779 (1975).
'7 UNIFORM Juv. CT. Acr

§ 34(a) (1968).
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